Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan
COIN operations must accomplish three tasks simultaneously:

- Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral disposition.
- Influence neutral-minded individuals to adopt a supportive disposition.
- Retain supportive individuals.

These operations are conducted in an environment where tensions and hostilities between groups may destabilize a society and provide opportunities for insurgents:

- This environment may suggest courses of action aimed at reinforcing or widening seams.
• An increase in Coalition funding will influence economic investment and development.
• A strengthened economy will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group.
• An increase in Coalition funding will significantly impact the restoration of essential services.

• Improvements in the provision of essential services will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group.
A government that is established, recognized, and that maintains a secure environment is in a position to

- Send a positive, credible message of success to the populace.
- Provide an environment that enhances stable employment of the workforce.
- Persuade insurgents and neutrals to consider becoming supporters.
An appropriate force mix, and correct operational tempo, timing, and synchronization will have very significant impacts on

- The restoration of essential services.
- The populace’s perception of security.
- The Government’s and COIN forces’ credibility in their communications efforts with the populace.
The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24
The Basic Information Ops Loop
Popular Support – Sympathizers and Active Supporters
Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures

Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’t and CF

Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Insurgents

Perception of Insurgent Strength and Intent

Fear of Ins. Attack, Repercussions

Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment

Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins

Perception of Gov’t Strength and Intent

Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment

Expectations for Security, Services & Employment

Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment

Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry

Cultural Erosion/Displacement

Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures

Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path

Average Connectedness of Population

Perceived Security

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Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures
Feedback Loop Examples:

1. Insurgent expansion: Insurgent factions with havens as base can expand their presence and influence, further increasing their operating base territory. (Permissive population contribution to Havens / Ability to Operate input from separate sector).

2. Alignment of criminal and insurgent interests: Weakly governed/policed territory may support insurgents, terrorists and criminals alike. Often interests align and lines blur with criminal activity and funding contributing to insurgent operations and expansion, further increasing the weakly governed territory and ability to operate.
Feedback Loop Examples:
1. Agricultural production and markets: Investment and spending enables agricultural production. Production can boost economic activity and trade which feeds back into private sector re-investment. (Public policy and investment in infrastructure, workforce, financial markets, etc helps start / maintain private sector momentum.)
2. Making legit agriculture more attractive: Improved legit agricultural opportunities may make illegit agricultural options less attractive which further increases legit agricultural production, trade, and markets. (Other inputs to decisions related to legit vs illegit from other sectors.)
Infrastructure, Services, & Economy
Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts

Feedback Loop Example:
Informal learning and mentoring: Formal training and vetting (enabled by institutional capacity) can improve and maintain Government workforce skill and professionalism. However, as you build a skilled, professional workforce base and culture, informal learning and expectations for behavior is also very powerful (and can contribute to institutional development as well...another key loop)
Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts
Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support
ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts – Tactical & Institutional

Feedback Loop Examples:
1. ANSF success and informal momentum: ANSF professionalism and skill contributes to tactical capacity which enables effective operations. Success and experience feeds back into professionalism, skill and morale which further reinforces both leadership & tactical capacity and recruiting / retention.
2. ANSF institutional capacity: Institutional capacity and processes enable manpower, formal training, logistics, planning & budgeting, etc that reinforce informal gains support ANSF capacity over time.
Key Feedback Loop: Securing and Empowering the Population

Fear is a key mechanism for insurgent factions to prevent the population from engaging and actively supporting the Government. Securing populated territory (clear and hold ops) can reduce insurgent ability to target and intimidate the population such that Gov’t sympathizers are willing to be active supporters.

- HUMINT: The population will be more willing to provide intel if they do not fear insurgent repercussions.
- ANA & ANP Development: ANSF recruiting and development is facilitated by the expansion of secure regions. (ANA and ANP leaders, families, facilities, etc less likely to be targeted or overrun.)
Key Feedback Loop: Government Engagement and Integration of Tribal Governance

Critical for the Government to recognize and make the effort to engage existing tribal structures and Governance if they are to be accepted by the population. Ties to local governance can gain popular support and rapidly expand the Government’s overall capacity and ‘reach’ which further increases their capacity and ability to engage the population.
Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and availability impact which is relatively more effective in influencing the population. Government message quality has been stronger relative to insurgent factions (who have typically not made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian beliefs), but lack of progress has undermined message credibility.

Message availability is constrained by low “average connectedness” (rural populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and most message propagation/amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). WOM tends to amplify negative messages more strongly than positive, but also tends to be biased towards current sentiments.

“Western affiliation backlash” may undermine Government messages if they are seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an overly Western posture.

WORKING DRAFT
Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics
– Claim the Information Initiative

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**Population Security:** Security is a function of day to day conditions and also perception of ‘who will win’ over longer term.

- **Actual damages** by both the Insurgents and ANSF / Coalition forces impact perceived security.
- Insurgents rely targeted “attacks on progress” to generate fear and intimidation to limit sympathizers moving towards active supporters. They often threaten or target civilian and security force individuals who are visibly supporting the government – the fear this generates is powerful in slowing or reversing positive momentum.
- In addition to near term security concerns, the population is assessing ‘who will win’ over the long term by comparing perception of insurgent strength to perception of Government strength and also considering perceived Coalition commitment. (A key input to perceived strength is how much of the population lives in region secured by the Government.) They will hesitate to actively support the government if they feel they will fail, particularly if they have been witness to “clear and leave” operations.